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RESPONSES 
TO PERFORM OR PAY DAMAGES 
Gregory Klass* 
N The Myth of Efficient Breach, Daniel Markovits and Alan 
Schwartz deploy an original mix of instrumentalist, interpretive, 
and moral arguments.1 The instrumentalist arguments start from 
the premise that parties use contract law as a tool to maximize 
their individual gains from exchange, and then ask how it should be 
designed to best serve that purpose. Markovits and Schwartz’s 
most significant points here are the distributive equivalence of ex-
pectation damages and specific performance and their argument 
for the expectation remedy. The distributive equivalence thesis 
holds that in a competitive market with enough sophisticated par-
ties, anything a non-breaching party loses under the expectation 
remedy (or any other damage measure) she has already gained 
back in a lower price or other favorable terms.2 The argument for 
expectation damages rather than specific performance rests on the 
familiar claim that the expectation remedy achieves efficient per-
formance decisions with lower transaction costs than does specific 
performance.3 Expectation damages therefore provide greater net 
 
* John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1 Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses 
of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011). 
2 Markovits and Schwartz’s distributive claim, while not novel, is arguably un-
derappreciated in the literature. See Richard Craswell, Promises and Prices, 45 
Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16–20, available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Craswell%20Promises
%20and%20Prices.pdf); Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracomensa-
tory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369, 
373–76 (1990). 
3 While this thesis is common wisdom among economic thinking contracts scholars, 
Markovits and Schwartz add something new to the legal literature. In addition to the 
familiar claim that specific performance imposes higher ex post renegotiation costs 
because the parties are in a bilateral monopoly, they argue that it causes higher ex 
ante costs in reaching a deal because it requires considering more possible ex post 
states of the world and entails a more complex pricing formula. Markovits & 
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1966–69.  
I 
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gains of trade, from which it follows that a party stands to benefit 
more from the ex ante reduction in price with expectation damages 
than from the chance of extracting more ex post with specific per-
formance. Markovits and Schwartz’s interpretive claim, which 
builds on their instrumental arguments, is their so-called dual-
performance hypothesis: contracts between sophisticated parties 
are best interpreted as imposing an obligation to perform or pay 
damages, rather than simply an obligation to perform. Finally, 
Markovits and Schwartz make two big moral claims. They defend 
expectation damages against critics who argue that the remedy is at 
odds with parties’ moral obligations. The dual-performance hy-
pothesis shows that expectation damages are in fact a form of spe-
cific performance, which is just what the moral critics say the law 
should provide. And Markovits and Schwartz advance the affirma-
tive claim that not only are expectation damages compatible with 
morality, but also a commitment to perform or pay damages en-
ables arms-length respectful relationships that have a moral value 
all their own. In this Response, I venture a few thoughts about the 
dual-performance hypothesis and on Markovits and Schwartz’s an-
swer to the moral critics. 
The dual-performance hypothesis “holds that contracts typically 
impose alternative obligations on the promisor: either to supply 
goods or services for a specified price or to transfer to the promisee 
the gain the promisee would have made had those goods or ser-
vices been supplied.”4 In other words, although most contractual 
agreements are expressed in sentences of the form 
“A shall x,” 
where A is a party and x is some act or forbearance, what they ac-
tually say is that 
“A shall x or y,” 
where x, the “action term,” is some act or forbearance and y, the 
“transfer term,” is a payment sufficient to put the other party in the 
position she would have occupied had A xed. Philosophers will 
recognize this form of argument. A good deal of twentieth-century 
analytic philosophy attempted to solve, or dissolve, apparently sub-
 
4 Id. at 1948 (emphasis omitted). 
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stantive theoretical puzzles by showing that they rested on mis-
takes of meaning.5 As Ludwig Wittgenstein put the idea in a differ-
ent context: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get out-
side it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it 
to us inexorably.”6 These sentences, I think, express Markovits and 
Schwartz’s attitude toward familiar moral criticisms of the expecta-
tion remedy and the theory of efficient breach. The moral critics 
have been held captive by a false picture of the content of contrac-
tual promises. 
If Markovits and Schwartz’s moral argument is to succeed, the 
dual-performance hypothesis must be an empirical interpretive 
claim. Parties, or at least sophisticated parties, must in fact under-
stand their contracts to commit them not to perform the action 
term simpliciter, but to perform the action or the transfer term. 
[I]f promisee sophistication is assumed, the transfer term arises 
out of the parties’ actual intentions and not just out of intentions 
that it would be rational for them to have or fair to impute to 
them. The transfer promise . . . is as real, as much a product of 
the parties’ actual intentions, as the promises that constitute the 
action and price terms.7 
Dual-performance is not a mere theoretical construct. The transfer 
term is implied in fact by the price and other terms of the parties’ 
contract.8 
The argument for this empirical interpretive claim builds on 
Markovits and Schwartz’s instrumentalist theses. The distributive 
equivalence thesis starts from the insight that, assuming sophisti-
cated parties in a competitive market, expectation damages result 
in a lower price or other more favorable terms, as they permit each 
side to avoid performance for a price. In a contract between A and 
 
5 The most famous example is Bertrand Russell’s suggestion that the sentence “The 
present King of France is bald” is best understood as saying that there exists a person 
who both is the King of France and is bald. This allowed Russell to explain, for exam-
ple, how the sentence could be false, though one of its negations (“The present King 
of France is not bald”) is also false. Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 Mind 479, 490 
(1905). 
6 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 48–49 (G. E. M. Anscombe 
trans., 1953). 
7 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1978. 
8 Id. 
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B, therefore, what B loses after A’s breach under the expectation 
remedy as compared to specific performance, B gains at the time of 
contracting in better terms. Expectation damages and specific per-
formance are distributively equivalent. If transaction costs are 
lower with expectation damages than with specific performance, 
then at the time of contracting, B stands to gain more from the re-
duction in price she gets with expectation damages than she would 
from specific performance and the chance to renegotiate should A 
later want to avoid her contractual obligations. The parties there-
fore prefer the expectation remedy.9 Now here is the move to the 
dual-performance hypothesis: because B is a sophisticated party, 
she knows that the lower price or other favorable terms she gets 
under the expectation remedy are premised on the fact that, should 
performance become inefficient, A will choose to pay rather than 
perform. That is, B expects A to treat her contractual commitment 
as no more than a commitment to perform or pay damages. In fact, 
she wants A to treat it that way, for only if A does so can B get the 
advantage of the better terms, reduced transaction costs and 
greater gains of trade. From both parties’ perspectives, then, A 
commits herself not simply to perform, but to perform or pay dam-
ages, or more perspicuously, A commits herself to perform either 
an action term or a transfer term.  
Like Seana Shiffrin, I have my doubts about the success of this 
attempt to derive an “is” from an “ought.”10 For one thing, it is not 
obvious that even sophisticated parties always recognize what 
terms are in their risk-adjusted individual interests. The last thirty 
years have seen an explosion of work in cognitive psychology and 
behavioral economics, not to mention the recent global financial 
meltdown, all of which call that assumption into question. We can-
 
9 Markovits and Schwartz do not fully explain why the law should set the default 
remedy to accord with the preferences of sophisticated parties rather than those who 
are less familiar with the law. Because sophisticated parties are more likely to know 
the legal default, they are more likely to opt out if it is not the term they want. Setting 
the default at specific performance would force sophisticated parties to reveal their 
preferences for expectation damages when they contract with non-sophisticated par-
ties, thereby serving an educative function. In short, Markovits and Schwartz do not 
explain why the law should use a majoritarian rather than an information-forcing de-
fault. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 97–98 (1989). 
10 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98 
Va. L. Rev. 159, 163 (2012). 
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not move so quickly from the fact that rationally self-interested 
parties should prefer dual-performance commitments to the con-
clusion that sophisticated parties do prefer them. Moreover, even if 
sophisticated parties want commitments of the form “A shall x or 
y,” it does not follow that this is what they think they are getting 
when they write a contract that says only “A shall x.” Sophisticated 
parties know how to write take-or-pay or alternative-performance 
contracts when they want them, and in many industries they com-
monly do so. Markovits and Schwartz do not explain why parties 
choose to express their contracts using language that does not cor-
respond to their understanding of the commitment. One wants 
some empirical evidence for Markovits and Schwartz’s empirical 
interpretive claim. Markovits and Schwartz are correct to observe 
that “principles of fidelity are not principles of interpretation.”11 
Nor, however, are analytic truths about economic models interpre-
tations of what people in the world outside those models intend or 
say.12 
Still, I like the dual-performance hypothesis. Whether the claim 
is descriptively accurate or not, it casts new light on the theory of 
efficient breach. Having argued that contracts typically involve dis-
junctive commitments—a commitment to satisfy the action term or 
the transfer term—Markovits and Schwartz can quickly conclude 
that “the expectation remedy is specific performance.”13 The mone-
tary award enjoins a breaching party to perform the transfer term. 
This suggests two surprising implications of the efficient breach 
theory. 
First, Markovits and Schwartz’s claim that expectation damages 
specifically enforce the disjunctive commitment raises an obvious 
 
11 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1987; see also Richard Craswell, Contract 
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 490 
(1989). 
12 In the Introduction, Markovits and Schwartz say that their arguments “are princi-
pally formal or analytic,” but that they “answer the current criticisms of the expecta-
tion remedy because the criticisms themselves are largely formal and analytic.” 
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1954. I am not sure how to reconcile these 
statements with their subsequent claims that the dual-performance hypothesis de-
scribes sophisticated parties’ actual intentions. Moreover, while moral criticisms of 
the expectation remedy often involve underdeveloped interpretive claims, those 
claims are not analytic in the sense Markovits and Schwartz use the term. They are 
not internal to an economic model of arms-length transactions. 
13 Id. at 1987. 
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question: why should courts enjoin the transfer term rather than 
the action term? Specific performance of the action term, together 
with the ability to avoid the injunction by performing the transfer, 
would give parties the same incentives expectation damages do. 
Faced with the prospect of court-compelled performance of the ac-
tion term, a party would choose to transfer if and only if the costs 
of performing (or being ordered to perform) the action term ex-
ceeded the other side’s expected value from that performance. 
If there is an instrumentalist answer, it involves transaction costs 
and investment incentives. Perhaps it is cheaper for courts to en-
force the payment of money than to enjoin other acts or forbear-
ances. And if the parties do not specify a dollar amount in advance, 
they might worry that they will need a court to sort out the exit 
price in any case. Such explanations, however, come from outside 
the model. If, for example, the parties can build the expectation 
remedy into the price, surely they can agree on a risk-adjusted exit 
price that would protect a party’s expectation interest. So here is a 
first surprising result: the model that supports expectation damages 
equally supports specific performance of the action term together 
with an option to avoid performance for a price. 
The above point is not meant as a criticism. Markovits and 
Schwartz are not attempting an a priori argument that expectation 
damages beat all comers, but a defense of expectation damages 
against critics who say that specific performance better reflects the 
parties’ moral obligations. Still, taking the dual-performance hy-
pothesis seriously tells us something about the theory of efficient 
breach. In that theory’s nearly frictionless world, the parties might 
instead choose specific performance plus an option to buy one’s 
way out of the duty to perform. 
A second implication of the dual-performance hypothesis is a bit 
more at odds with what Markovits and Schwartz say. As Markovits 
and Schwartz observe, if you believe the dual-performance hy-
pothesis, the entitlement to performance is protected not by a li-
ability rule but rather by a property rule.14 A party cannot avoid 
her obligation to perform the action or transfer term without first 
obtaining the other side’s consent. The standard theory of property 
and liability rules explains why this should be so. Property rules are 
 
14 Id. at 1988–89. 
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appropriate when lawmakers can identify socially undesirable be-
havior with a high degree of certainty, though they find it difficult 
to quantify its costs.15 This describes breach of a dual-performance 
commitment. Because the transfer term requires only the payment 
of money, it is purely redistributive. In the model, money has the 
same value in anyone’s hands, and so transfers of it do not create 
new value. But the redistribution is not costless. The failure to pay 
the transfer term undermines trust in future commitments. Mark-
ovits and Schwartz can therefore conclude that “no true breach is 
efficient.”16 Breach of the obligation to act or transfer should not be 
priced, but prohibited. 
But then why specific performance? There are property rules 
and then there are property rules. While injunctive relief is com-
monly classified as a form of property-rule protection, the incen-
tives it provides are very different from those created by punitive 
damages or criminal sanctions. True penalties deter nonconsensual 
takings tout court. Steal a loaf of bread and you land in jail. Com-
mit civil fraud and you risk a punitive award that exceeds your ex-
pected profit. Injunctive relief, in contrast, does not penalize the 
initial nonconsensual taking. Instead, an injunction clarifies what 
the entitlement is and establishes that any future nonconsensual 
taking of it will be penalized by civil or criminal contempt. Why 
should contract law give the promisor who has refused to act or 
transfer a do-over? The theory supports awarding punitive dam-
ages to the promisee who has been forced to go to court to vindi-
cate her entitlement to performance of the disjunctive obligation. 
This result dovetails with a hypothesis I have developed else-
where: that in many transactions, parties might reasonably want a 
rule that would apply extracompensatory remedies to a breaching 
party’s failure to cooperate in the recovery of damages.17 It also 
corresponds to the letter of California’s brief experiment with pu-
nitive damages for bad faith breach. In Seaman’s Direct Buying 
Service v. Standard Oil Co., the California Supreme Court held that 
punitive damages are appropriate when a party, “in addition to 
breaching the contract, . . . seeks to shield itself from liability by 
 
15 See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1524–25 (1984). 
16 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1949. 
17 Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117 Yale L.J. 2, 54–60 
(2007). 
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denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract 
exists.”18 The same logic explains the treble damages and per-claim 
penalties that the False Claims Act imposes against government 
contractors who lie about performance,19 as well as judicial readings 
of the statute as imposing on government contractors an affirma-
tive duty to disclose any material breaches.20 And we can make 
sense of the result on the traditional account of efficient breach. 
Efficient breach takes as a premise that recovering damages is rela-
tively cheap. Recovery is cheap when the breaching party willingly 
pays, or at least does not actively obstruct, recovery. While the ef-
ficient breach theory recommends pricing a party’s first-order enti-
tlement to performance, it supports protecting the non-breaching 
party’s second-order entitlement to that price with a property rule 
like punitive damages.21 
Markovits and Schwartz recognize this potential implication: 
[I]f punitive damages for gross breach of contract have had a 
short career in American law, this is not because of any princi-
pled tension between their moralizing nature and the normative 
structure of the expectation remedy. Rather, courts are reluctant 
to award punitive damages for breach of contract because of 
pragmatic difficulties that are internal to the effective articula-
tion and administration of a punitive damages regime itself.22 
But Markovits and Schwartz’s explanation of those “pragmatic dif-
ficulties” is incomplete. They argue that courts might find it “diffi-
cult to distinguish gross breaches of contract (for example, bad 
faith breaches) from breaches that violate only the contract it-
 
18 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984). I describe the Seaman’s rule in more detail, and 
defend it against its critics, in Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, supra note 17, 
at 38–41. 
19 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
20 Michael Holt and I analyze these developments in Implied Certification Under the 
False Claims Act, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2011). Three important decisions in this line of 
cases are United States v. Science Applications International Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 
(D.C. Cir. 2010), Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 702 (2d Cir. 2001), and Ab-Tech Con-
struction, Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 433–34 (Fed. Cl. 1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d 
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). 
21 The result can be generalized. All liability rules are ultimately backed by property 
rules. There is no point in pricing failure to pay the price. 
22 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1989–90 (footnote omitted). 
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self.”23 But they do not define “bad faith breach” of a dual-
performance obligation. They say an example would be failing to 
transfer “on the impermissible ground that legal costs will deter a 
promisee’s lawsuit.”24 On their model, however, a party’s motives 
for breaching both the action and transfer terms should be immate-
rial. Breach of the disjunctive obligation is always inefficient. There 
is no reason to permit a do-over with specific performance rather 
than simply punish the wrong. 
If there is an answer here, I think it is the sense that contract 
disputes often result from genuine disagreements among the par-
ties as to just what their contractual rights and obligations are.25 
There is no point in imposing punitive damages on a party who 
“takes” an entitlement because she honestly believes it does not 
exist—who breaches her contract because she is mistaken about 
what it requires of her. The threatened penalty has no purchase. 
The court’s function in these cases is more to resolve the legal in-
terpretive questions than to protect the entitlement to perform-
ance. Only after the parties’ duties have been clarified should their 
breach be penalized. 
Markovits and Schwartz’s model therefore suggests expectation 
damages for parties who breach because they are honestly mis-
taken about their contractual obligations, and punitive damages for 
those who knowingly breach the action term and also fail to pay 
the transfer amount. Would courts find it difficult to distinguish 
these cases? Perhaps at the margins. But there are also easy cases, 
and courts can use familiar tools like burdens of proof, scienter re-
quirements, and the like to get at them.26 While Markovits and 
Schwartz minimize the result, their dual-performance hypothesis, 
as well as the theory of efficient breach that it builds on, supports a 
much larger role for punitive damages than contract law currently 
provides. 
The above thoughts about specific performance and punitive 
damages come largely from within Markovits and Schwartz’s 
model. I now want to step outside of it and say a few words about 
 
23 Id. at 1989. 
24 Id. at 1988. 
25 A possible explanation for that fact is the self-serving bias. But then cognitive bi-
ases of this sort lie outside of Markovits and Schwartz’s model. 
26 For more details on this point, see Klass, supra note 17, at 54–60. 
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their argument that the dual-performance hypothesis answers 
moral criticisms of contract law’s preference for expectation dam-
ages. 
Claims that there is a tension between contract remedies and 
morality are not trivial. Anyone who teaches U.S. contract law 
knows the distance between students’ untutored moral intuitions 
and the remedies that the law provides. I read this to be the point 
of Justice Holmes’s infamous statement that “[t]he duty to keep a 
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay 
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”27 The “Holme-
sian heresy” is best read not as a theoretical account of how to un-
derstand contract law, as Markovits and Schwartz would have it. It 
is rather advice to future lawyers about how to identify, or predict, 
what the law is, which is what their clients will require of them.28 
Confusing contract law with the morality of promises causes false 
predictions because, most obviously, promises are subject to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda—agreements are to be kept—
while the law does not force parties to keep their contractual 
agreements. Especially counterintuitive is the case of the promisor 
who breaches to take advantage of a better opportunity, a para-
digm for the efficient breach theorist. Promises are meant to ex-
clude from the promisor’s performance decision such considera-
tions of self-interest and profit. Yet the law permits them. Thus the 
perceived tension between contract and morality. 
Like Markovits and Schwartz, I think the moral critics have it 
wrong but for different reasons. Markovits and Schwartz’s argu-
ment is one of four possible responses to the moral critics, and not 
the best of them. 
 
27 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), re-
printed in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 995 (1997). 
28 Justice Holmes’s thoughts on how to understand the law can be found in the latter 
two-thirds of the article. There Holmes first describes a hermeneutics of suspicion 
that reveals the hidden purpose of legal rules (“[w]hen you get the dragon out of his 
cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see 
just what is his strength,” id. at 469) and then recommends a new, more rational form 
of jurisprudence (“the social end which is aimed at by a rule of law is obscured and 
only partially attained in consequence of the fact that the rule owes its form to a 
gradual historical development, instead of being reshaped as a whole, with conscious 
articulate reference to the end in view,” id.). Cf. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, 
at 1981. 
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One answer to the felt tension between contract law and moral-
ity is to argue that contract law has nothing to do with the parties’ 
moral obligations. This thesis is commonly joined with a descrip-
tion of contract law as a pure power-conferring rule.29 Contract 
law’s function, on that description, is to enable persons to under-
take legal obligations when they choose to do so. The law imposes 
obligations on the parties to a contract because they have asked for 
them. The legal reasons for enforcement have nothing to do with 
the parties’ moral obligations to one another. It is a category mis-
take to criticize contract law for being at odds with morality. 
I will not spend much time on this answer, which is not Mark-
ovits and Schwartz’s. I have argued elsewhere that power-
conferring theories describe only one side of the contract law we 
have. There are good reasons to think that contract law imposes 
duties on parties for reasons other than the fact that they have cho-
sen to be legally obligated.30 Nor does the approach answer Seana 
Shiffrin’s more subtle claim that no matter what the purpose of 
contract law, we do not want its rules to depart too far from the 
dictates of morality, lest it degrade our moral culture.31 
The second answer, which is the one Markovits and Schwartz 
opt for, maintains that the moral critique misunderstands the con-
tent of contractual promises.32 The argument here exploits the fact 
that promissory obligations are largely content neutral. If a prom-
ise has the form 
“I promise s,” 
 
29 For examples, see Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal 
Theory of Contract (2003); Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is 
Consent, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7–9, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792586); Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 801, 801–02 (2008). 
30 Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and Compound Rule, 83 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726, 1727–31 (2008). 
31 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. 
Rev. 708, 740–43 (2007). 
32 This answer can also be found in, for example, Craswell, supra note 2 (manuscript 
at 46–51); Barbara H. Fried, The Holmesian Bad Man Flubs His Entrance, The Limits 
of Non-Consequentialism in Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 
2012) (manuscript at 5-7); Avery W. Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 Suf-
folk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1–3, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1845703); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract 
and Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603, 1603–08 (2009). 
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where s stands for a proposition describing one’s future actions, the 
speech act’s moral force lies in the “I promise,” not in s. Promises 
are morally binding because of the moral quality of the act of 
promising, not because of the moral quality of the act promised. 
Content neutrality allows one to grant that the moral critics might 
be correct to identify contracts as promises, but to argue that they 
misunderstand the content of those promises—they misinterpret s. 
The content of the promise includes both the right and the remedy. 
As Richard Craswell put the point over twenty years ago, “the 
rules governing such topics as remedies and excuses could effec-
tively be treated as just a more complete definition of the exact ob-
ligation undertaken by the promisor.”33 Or in Markovits and 
Schwartz’s formulation, “the legal remedy is an implied term.”34 
Contractual promises are weaker than the moral critics think be-
cause the content includes less demanding remedial obligations 
than do the promises that the moral critics take as their paradigms. 
I will not discuss the merits of this answer. I have already sug-
gested some problems with Markovits and Schwartz’s version of it. 
Instead, I want to identify two other ways of answering the moral 
critics. Both, I think, better describe the contract law we have and 
its relation to the parties’ moral obligations.35 
The third possible answer focuses not on the content of parties’ 
moral obligations, but rather on their source and type. Instead of 
proposing a new interpretation of s, this approach questions 
whether contracts in fact involve an “I promise . . . .” As Hume ob-
served, “Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by agreement 
or convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each 
other.”36 By the same token, two parties might agree to an ex-
change without promising performance—without expressing an in-
tent to undertake a moral obligation by the very expression of that 
intent. The absence of a promise does not mean the agreement is 
morally inert. Non-promissory exchange agreements can generate 
 
33 Craswell, supra note 11, at 504. 
34 Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1953 n.31. 
35 I examine both in more detail in Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 Suffolk U. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 11–14, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1762075). 
36 David Hume, Of Morals, in A Treatise of Human Nature 455, 490 (London, Clar-
enden Press, reprt. 1888).  
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reliance-based obligations, obligations of trust, obligations of recip-
rocity, obligations rooted in the parties’ relationship, or some com-
bination of these and other moral reasons to perform. And these 
obligations might be weaker than promissory ones—not because 
they have a different content but because they are obligations of a 
different type. A non-promissory moral duty to perform might not 
exclude so many considerations of one’s own interests from the 
performance decision. It might require greater flexibility in per-
formance from both sides. And it might impose remedial obliga-
tions that differ from a promise-breaker’s second-order moral obli-
gations. If the law of contracts does not fit with promissory 
obligations to perform, perhaps it better fits the non-promissory 
obligations that attach to agreements for consideration. If so, that 
fit is a reason to interpret contract law as concerned less with 
promises than with other sorts of agreement-based obligations. 
Like Markovits and Schwartz’s dual-performance hypothesis, 
this third answer suggests that those who see a tension between 
contract and promise have been held captive by a false picture. But 
the picture comes from a different place. Markovits and Schwartz 
locate the confusion in the fact that parties use sentences of the 
form “I shall x,” when in fact they mean “I shall x or y.” I am sug-
gesting that it lies in theorists’ assumption that parties have prom-
ised performance, when in fact parties rarely use the words “I 
promise . . .” or their equivalent. 
A fourth possible response is that moral critics assume too sim-
ple a view of the available moral functions of the law. One way of 
putting the perceived tension between contract and promise is that 
contract requires less of a party than does morality. Morality re-
quires, for example, that the promisor forgo a better opportunity 
for the sake of performance, while contract law permits her to 
avoid performance for a price. This is a problem, however, only if 
we assume that if contract law has a moral function, it must be to 
enforce parties’ moral obligations.37 But contract law might have 
other sorts of moral functions. Here are two possibilities: First, 
contract law might aim to enforce not first-order obligations to per-
 
37 “If expectation damages were merely substitutionary, courts that award them 
would leave promisees with something other than what they have bargained for, and 
hence (perhaps) would undermine contract’s essential purpose.” Markovits & 
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1984. 
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form, but second-order obligations that arise upon the breach of 
those first-order obligations. There are good reasons in many con-
texts to leave the performance decision to considerations of reputa-
tion, relationship, community norms, and morality. A contract law 
that is sensitive to those reasons might attempt not to deter or pun-
ish breach, but only to clean up the mess it leaves behind. Such a 
contract would serve morality under the heading of corrective jus-
tice. Second, and not incompatibly, the purpose of contract law 
might involve not enforcing individual parties’ obligations, but fos-
tering a moral culture in which people choose to perform for the 
right reasons. Contract law might, for example, have an expressive 
function. An award of expectation damages marks the fact that one 
party has wronged the other, and thereby supports the social prac-
tice of making and keeping agreements. 
Either of these alternative accounts of the moral purpose of con-
tract law might recognize that contract remedies also tend to deter 
breach, and even see that as a good thing. But neither considers en-
forcement of the moral obligation to perform the raison d’être of 
contract law. The problem with the moral criticism is that it rests 
on an oversimplified picture of the possible moral functions of con-
tract law.38 
In my view the third and fourth answers better cohere with the 
contract law we have than does the dual-performance hypothesis. 
That is a much bigger claim than I can defend here, so I will close 
with a thought about how it connects with my discussion of puni-
tive damages. I have argued that, from the perspective of Mark-
ovits and Schwartz’s model, punitive damages should be available 
for a party’s knowing failure to perform or pay. If we look to the 
law, however, we find not only a preference for compensatory 
measures but also mandatory limits on parties’ ability to contract 
for more.39 What explains the gap between the law we have and the 
law that Markovits and Schwartz’s model recommends? 
 
38 My argument here might be compared to Richard Craswell’s argument that moral 
critics unduly assume that “promises must either (1) oblige the promisor to perform 
the promised actions, or (2) have no moral force at all.” Richard Craswell, Two Eco-
nomic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays 
19, 27 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). Where Craswell emphasizes an alternative economic 
understanding of legal remedies—as altering incentives rather than imposing and en-
forcing obligations—I am suggesting alternative moral understandings. 
39 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 356, 359(1) (1979). 
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One possible answer is that the penalty rule and the rule against 
punitive damages are simply misguided. I have argued elsewhere 
that courts should permit parties to attach extracompensatory 
remedies to the breach of terms designed to enable recovery in the 
case of breach, such as an obligation to share information about 
performance.40 That suggestion, however, is much more modest 
than what I claim to be the implications of Markovits and 
Schwartz’s model, which is that punitive damages should be avail-
able for any knowing failure to perform or pay. Still, if you adhere 
to their model, you might say that the existing preference for com-
pensatory damages is simply wrong. 
Markovits and Schwartz have a different answer, which involves 
the practical costs of punitive damages. They worry about the pos-
sibility of false positives: that courts will impose punitive damages 
in cases in which nonperformance was the result of mistake (and 
punitive awards can do no good) or even where there was no 
breach at all. That’s not a bad answer, though Markovits and 
Schwartz need to do more work to make it convincing. 
But there is also a third possible answer: Markovits and 
Schwartz’s model does not capture everything that is happening in 
the law of contracts. Their model leaves no room, for example, for 
considerations of corrective justice or for society’s interest in sup-
porting the moral practice of entering into and keeping agree-
ments, both of which might explain why courts do not award puni-
tive damages for first-order breach. Compensatory damages are 
the bread and butter of corrective justice; and they support the 
practice by sending a message that breach is wrong while reserving 
expressions of greater disapprobation (punitive damages) for more 
significant wrongs, such as fraud in the inducement. Markovits and 
Schwartz’s instrumental model cannot comprehend such moral ar-
guments against punitive damages for first-order breach. Especially 
telling, I think, is the fact that the rules against penalties for first-
order breach are not mere defaults, but mandatory limits around 
which parties cannot contract. The law gives parties wide latitude 
to define their contractual obligations to one another. This is free-
dom of contract. It does not, however, permit them to contract for 
remedies that run contrary to the social purpose of enforcing their 
 
40 Klass, supra note 17, at 11–13. 
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agreements. The duty to perform is chosen; the duty to pay dam-
ages is not. If this is right, it can only cause confusion to interpret 
contractual commitments, even between sophisticated parties, as 
promises to perform or pay. 
 
